[Study on willingness to participate and willingness to pay for hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme].
To investigate workers' willingness to participate and wiliness to pay for a hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme, to analyze the influential factors, and to provide information for policy making of the government. Multistage cluster sampling was used to select subjects: In the first stage, 9 small, medium, orlarge enterprises were selected fromthree cities (counties) in Zhejiang province, China, according to the level of economic development, transportation convenience, and cooperation of government agencies; in the second stage, several workshops were randomly selected from each of the 9 enterprises. Face-to-face interviews among all workers in the workshops were conducted by trained interviewers using a pre-designed questionnaire. It was found that 73.87% (2095) of all workers were willing to participate in the hypothetical work injury insurance scheme and to pay 2.21% of monthly wage (51.77 yuan) on average, and more than half of the workers were willing to pay less than 1%of monthly wage (35 yuan). Of the 741 workers who were not willing to participate, 327 thought that the premium should be borne by the state or enterprises, instead of individuals, and others were not willing to participate because of low income, unstable job, or poor understanding of the hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme. Logistic regression analysis showed that workers with higher education levels, longer length of services, longer weekly working time, or more knowledge of occupational diseases showed higher willingness to participate in the scheme; workers who were exposed to physical hazards, had health records, or had participated in the existing medical insurance or industrial injury insurance were more willing to participate. Multiple linear regression analysis showed that with increasing average monthly wage, weekly working time, and self?health evaluation, the proportion of workers with willingness to pay increased; however, with increasing work intensity and awareness of occupational disease, the proportion of workers with willingness to pay decreased. The workers who were not covered by the industrial injury insurance paid more than those covered by the industrial injury insurance. The hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme increased the applicability and advantage of independent third-party running and lifetime insurance, which significantly increased the workers' willingness to participate in or to pay for the insurance scheme. Therefore, the industrial injury insurance can be improved in these aspects to promote workers' willingness to participate in and to pay for the insurance scheme. This conclusion provided a reference for the solution of delayed or shirking corporate responsibility for paying the premium.